To voice their protest, Kashmir youth harness the power of the internet

Kashmir protests go digital

BY YOUSRA Y. FAZILI 

This summer as Kashmiris took to the streets, pelting rocks, holding sit-ins, and chanting slogans during demonstrations in the moments between eerily empty streets where harhtal (strikes) and military-enforced curfews, closed the city, a Facebook campaign went viral. The campaign was a simple two words "I protest." For a people without a national flag, let alone consensus on what a solution for Kashmir would look like, there are no simple symbols for an expression of nationalism. Yet overnight on Facebook, Kashmiris in the valley, across the Line of Control, and in the diaspora urged their friends and family to change their profile pictures to a single simple message of solidarity: "I protest."

But what exactly is it that Kashmiris are protesting? The Indian presence in Kashmir is nothing new, and this summer's violence did not match that of 1989 when Kashmiris took up arms in an effort to be rid of Indian control over the region. The summer of 2010 was marked by calls for trilateral talks as protests seeking azadi (independence), curfews, and strikes spread from the capital of Srinagar throughout the valley of Indian-administered Kashmir.

Tensions had been mounting since the summer of 2009 when the May 30 alleged rape and murder of two young women, Nilofer Shakeel and Asiya Jan from the apple orchard village of Shopian by Indian security forces sparked protests throughout Kashmir. The case came to represent several injustices: rape as a weapon of war, a Delhi-based effort to cover up the crime, and the immunity that shields the allegedly criminal behavior of Indian security forces in Kashmir. Though protests and demonstrations against India's policies in Kashmir continued throughout the year, popular discontent was catalyzed on June 11 when local police in Kashmir killed 17-year-old high school student Tufail Ahmad Matoo, who had been walking, backpack in hand, close to a demonstration.

His death marked the fourth time in 2010 where police and CRFP (India's paramilitary Central Reserve Police Force) killed teenagers through the use of excessive force. The ensuing demonstrations opened the floodgates of popular expression against India's heavy-handed military rule and the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (applied to Kashmir since 1990), which gives the Indian army and paramilitary forces sweeping powers to shoot and kill, search homes and people, detain civilians indefinitely without charges, and confiscate property.

Human rights organizations like Human Rights Watch have decried the Armed Forces Special Powers Act because it shields soldiers from prosecution while opening the door to rampant human rights violations.

A few years ago mainstream Kashmiri separatists consciously began to turn away from violent methods towards peaceful civil disobedience. Yet even these efforts, with sit-down demonstrations, rallies, frequent strikes and stone-pelting, have been met with disproportionate excessive force by Indian security forces including bullets and tear gas. Approximately 245 teenage stone throwers have been held in indefinite custody since June.

These abuses face scant media attention, both from the Indian and international media. This is largely due to India's policies blocking journalists from entering Kashmir, making media coverage of Kashmir a near impossibility in times of unrest. However, Kashmiris are slowly harnessing the power of the internet to create a communal digital protest and to forge a voice for themselves in the democratic realm of cyberspace. In 2010 Kashmir's Generation Next, those who were born or young during the turbulence of the 1990s, found their voices. Unlike Kashmiri youth of the 1990s who were silenced given India's media, U.N. and NGO blackout of Kashmir, new technologies and social media have made it possible for Kashmiris to begin to tell their own stories, to have a voice and a narrative that can reach beyond the Valley and into international consciousness. Facebook and YouTube have been transformative, creating a cadre of citizen-journalists and more artistic expressions in which Kashmiris create video montages set to music and images, providing a voice whether in Kashmiri or English, such as Kashmiri-American Mubashir Mohi-u-Din's take on the Steven Van Zandt song Patriot.

This summer Kashmir's youth have learned two lessons from other international struggles for justice: Iran and Palestine. In 2009 Iranian youth and social activists harnessed the power of social media as young Iranians took to the internet and street in the face of state suppression. Iranians demanded "where is my vote?" -- the slogan, appearing curiously and ubiquitously in English, was meant for an international audience, to raise attention to the struggles occurring within the Islamic Republic of Iran after the results of the presidential election were called into question. Similarly, "I protest" cries out in a language that is not native to Kashmir but has united Kashmiris globally as they seek an international audience.

The second lesson has come from the first Palestinian intifada of 1987, which started shortly before Kashmiris began to protest in earnest on a cold January day in 1989 against rigged election results. Unlike the "children of the stone," the moniker given to the stone wielding youths who sought a way to express their discontent with Israeli occupation, the Kashmiris of the early 1990s soon turned to violent means to oppose India's acute military presence and perceived human rights violations. Since that time both documented human rights violations and a strong military presence of 700,000 continues; there is one Indian security personnel for every 20 Kashmiris.

In 1995, Yasin Malik, the head of the populist Jammu & Kashmir Liberation Front (JKLF), publicly renounced violence as a means of liberation. While this tactic created divisions within the JKLF, Kashmiris are turning away from weapons to adopt less violent means. Last year Malik continued his efforts to encourage a passive resistance marked by sit-ins, strikes, and the lesson from the intifada, throwing stones instead of exchanging bullets.

Kashmiris have made a critical move from guns to stones. They have largely moved from militancy to civil demonstrations and protests. Despite this shift, India has failed to recognize how the shift to less violent tactics has opened a space for dialogue and continued its heavy-handed policies, which only stir resentment towards India. Just recently, acclaimed novelist Arundhati Roy faced possible sedition charges for criticizing India's military occupation and for suggesting that force may not be the best means to keep India a cohesive nation. She cast her support for the Azadi movement, which she characterized as a struggle for justice.

 Yet, despite tactics meant to invoke international sympathy and raise attention for the people of Kashmir, Kashmiris remain outsiders to a process that will decide their fate. As U.S. President Barack Obama visits India now, Kashmiris hope that Kashmir will be more than a talking point regarding Indian and Pakistani security, more than a discussion of jihadi movements from Afghanistan into India, and more than a focal point of Indian-Pakistani tension. Perhaps what they protest most is their invisibility, the refusal to see Kashmiris as part of a solution. The iProtest refuses the bilateral assumption of India-Pakistan negotiations that leave Kashmiris silenced.

Remarking on the political nature of current unrest in Kashmir and India's refusal to seek productive dialogue with separatists, Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, a leader of All Parties Hurriyat Conference, remarked: "It is the youth of Kashmir agitating. Why are they throwing stones and risking their lives? No one wants to hear their story." Indeed, the e-protest of this summer remains a real protest on the ground, with flesh and blood casualties. The iProtest has moved beyond Facebook and Blogspot; it has sparked hope in a young generation while renewing the hopes of an older generation, that maybe the critical moment has come when someone will look to the "I" who protests to ask exactly what is it that they want, and perhaps, we should listen in.

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Yousra Y. Fazili is a Kashmiri-American attorney based in Washington DC where she works on South Asian and Middle East policy. A Fulbright Scholar and graduate of Brown University and Harvard Divinity School, she has worked with the U.S. Department of Justice and the United Nations.

ROUF BHAT/AFP/Getty Images

Source: The AfPak Channel Inside the War for South Asia  

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HOBSONIAN CHOICE FOR DELHI: KASHMIR OR UNSC SEAT?

AZADI

The Obama “Kashmir trip” is being planned in Washington–and it sends shivers up the spine of Delhi analysts. Political Scientists around the world are analyzing every word spoken by President Obama.

Rupee News

September 2010 was not a good month for India. The fiasco in Afghanistan, the debacle of the Delhi Games, the Ayodhya verdict and now the UN report disparaging. Not good news for Shining India. The United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) is ready to publish a report describing the brutal human rights violations in Indian Occupied Kashmir. The strongly-worded report will diligently take an inventory of all the events that took place in the Indian Occupied Kashmir valley after June 11. The report will prolifically describe the atrocities committed by Indian security forces from June to September. The panicked Indian side is holding secret talks with the top UN hierarchy and will try to convince them not to publish the strongly worded report. “Hundreds of cases of murders, assaults, and torture on youth, women and children are going to be reported sometime any sooner”. The Chinese are pushing the UN to publish the report as soon as possible.

There is copious information available on the UN, Kashmir and Obama’s agenda for it. Most of the Obama policy is based on the writings and agenda of one Bruce Riedel who seems to have found the Alladin’s Lamp in resolving all problems of South Asia.

For the U.S., reducing and resolving the India-Pakistan Cold War before it goes hot is critical to stability in South Asia, isolating the jihadi extremists and preventing a war in South Asia that could go nuclear. Riedel

The Times of India places a lot of emphasis on Bruce Riedel because it suits the Delhi solutions. Bob Woodward’s book, “Obama’s Wars” also has excerpts that discuss Kashmir as central issue which would resolve Afghanistan.

Mr. Riedel seems to think that he can impose his agenda on Pakistan and India and eliminate all the tensions in South Asia. Mr. Riedel’s solution to Kashmir goes something like this.

1) The LOC is made the permanent border between Pakistan and India.

2) The border between Azad Kashmir and Indian Occupied Kashmir is made a soft border.

3) The Legislature of Indian Occupied Kashmir and Azad Kashmir meet on a periodic basis to resolve arts and craft issues.

Mr. Riedel seems to think that this is a solution. Obviously he is not aware of the ground realities in Kashmir or in Pakistan–or in India for that matter. The Kashmiri Intifada doesn’t want the status quo sprinkled with M&Ms called “Fake Azadi Made in USA”. The Kashmiris want a real solution–they want the withdrawal of Indian troops and they want accession with Pakistan.

Despite the threats and drone bombings, the ground realities in Afghanistan spell defeat and humiliation. Naveeta Kapoor eloquently describes is as follows “The recent spate of Kinetic activities indicate growing restless of America in resolving Af Pak or should we say Pak Af. There is one consistent message emanating from the “surge” about the Afghanistan conflict: it will be won or lost in the corridors of Islamabad and not the ravines of Waziristan.”

Various analysts have described the situation in Afghanistan–from desperate to hopeless. “A Proliferation of sticks now”, says that until Islamabad decides to end the conflict on terms favorable to it in Afghanistan: the end is nowhere in sight.

BEIJING PLAYING ITS KASHMIR CARD

Throughout the 1990s, a desire for stability on its southwestern flank and fears of an Indian-Pakistani nuclear arms race caused Beijing to take a more evenhanded approach to Kashmir, while still favouring Islamabad.

KASHMIR [VIEW POINT INDIA]

by Mohan Malik

Even as the Chinese navy signals its intent to enforce sea denial in the "first island chain" in the East (comprised of the Yellow Sea, the East China Sea and the South China Sea of the Pacific Ocean), the People's Liberation Army (PLA) is reportedly on the move along China's southwest frontier in Pakistani-held Kashmir. 

In late August, media accounts reported the presence of thousands of Chinese troops in the strategic northern areas (renamed Gilgit-Baltistan in 2009 by Pakistan) of Pakistani-held Kashmir, bordering Xinjiang province. 

A Western report suggested that Islamabad had ceded control of the area to Beijing, prompting denials from both capitals. Chinese Foreign Office spokesperson Jiang Yu denied the story, saying the troops are there to help Pakistan with ''flood relief work.'' 

Nonetheless, credible sources confirm the presence of the PLA's logistics and engineering corps to provide flood relief and to build large infrastructure projects worth US$20 billion (railways, dams, pipelines and extension of the Karakoram Highway) to assure unfettered Chinese access to the oil-rich Gulf through the Pakistani port of Gwadar. As China's external energy dependency has deepened in the past decade, so has its sense of insecurity and urgency. 

"THE KASHMIR CARD'

While China and India have long sparred over the Dalai Lama and Tibet's status, border incursions and China's growing footprint in southern Asia, a perceptible shift in the Chinese stance on Kashmir has now emerged as a new source of interstate friction.Throughout the 1990s, a desire for stability on its southwestern flank and fears of an Indian-Pakistani nuclear arms race caused Beijing to take a more evenhanded approach to Kashmir, while still favoring Islamabad. 

Yet, in a major policy departure since 2006, Beijing has been voicing open support for Pakistan and the Kashmiri separatists through its opposition to the UN Security Council ban on the jihadi organizations targeting India, economic assistance for infrastructure projects in northern Kashmir, and the issuance of separate visas by Chinese embassies to Indian citizens of Kashmiri origins. 

Amid the current unrest in the valley, Beijing has also invited Kashmiri separatist leaders for talks and offered itself as a mediator, ostensibly in a tit-for-tat for India's refuge for the Dalai Lama. Yet China is actually the third party to the dispute in Jammu and Kashmir (J&K). While India holds about 45% of J&K territory and Pakistan controls 35%, China occupies about 20% (including Aksai Chin and the Shaksgam Valley, ceded by Pakistan to China in 1963). 

The denial of a visa in July 2010 to the Indian Army's Northern Commander, General B S Jaswal – who was to lead the fourth bilateral defense dialogue in Beijing – because he commanded "a disputed area, Jammu and Kashmir", was said to be the last straw. 

Consequently, a new chill has descended on Sino-Indian relations. India retaliated by suspending defense exchanges with China and lodging a formal protest. New Delhi sees these moves as part of a new Chinese strategy with respect to Kashmir that seeks to nix its global ambitions and entangle India to prevent it from playing a role beyond the region. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh told Indian media: "Beijing could be tempted to use India's 'soft underbelly', Kashmir, and Pakistan to keep India in 'low-level equilibrium'." 

Resurrecting old issues and manufacturing new disputes to throw the other side off balance and enhance negotiating leverage is an old tactic in Chinese statecraft. The downturn in Sino-Indian ties since the mid-2000s may be partly attributed to the weakening of China's "Pakistan card" against India, necessitating the exercise of direct pressure against the latter. 

Beijing fears that an unrestrained Indian power would eventually threaten China's security along its southwestern frontiers. One Chinese analyst maintains that "Beijing would not abandon its 'Kashmir card.’ The Kashmir issue will remain active as long as China worries about its southern borders." China and Pakistan have been allies since the 1962 Sino-Indian conflict. This enduring alliance was formalized with the conclusion of the China-Pakistan "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation and Good-Neighborly Relations" in April 2005. 

Likewise, the sharper focus on Tawang is part of a shriller claim over Arunachal Pradesh in the east, which Beijing now calls "South Tibet" (a new Chinese term for Arunachal Pradesh since 2005), ostensibly to extend its claim over the territories. 

It is worth noting that prior to 2005, there was no reference to "South Tibet" in China's official media or any talk of the "unfinished business of the 1962 war." Nor did the Chinese government or official media ever claim that the PLA's "peaceful liberation of Tibet in 1950 was partial and incomplete" or that "a part of Tibet was yet to be liberated.'' 

Taking a cue from the Pakistanis, who have long described Kashmir as the "unfinished business of the 1947 partition,'' Chinese strategists now call Arunachal Pradesh, or more specifically, Tawang, the "unfinished business of the 1962 war." China also sought to internationalize its bilateral territorial dispute with India by opposing an Asian Development Bank loan in 2009, part of which was earmarked for a watershed project in Arunachal Pradesh. 

Chinese strategic writings indicate that as China becomes more economically and militarily powerful, Beijing is devising new stratagems to keep its southern rival in check. Some Chinese economists calculate that within a decade or so, India could come close to "spoiling Beijing's party of the century" by outpacing China in economic growth. From Beijing's perspective, India's rise as an economic and military power would prolong American hegemony in Asia, and thereby hinder the establishment of a post-American, Sino-centric hierarchical order in the Asia-Pacific region. 

The past decade has, therefore, seen the Chinese military bolstering its strength all along the disputed borders from Kashmir to Burma (aka Myanmar). Beijing also prefers a powerful and well-armed Pakistani military, as that helps it mount pressure, by proxy, on India. China continues to shower its "all-weather" friend with military and civilian assistance ranging from ballistic missiles and JF-17 fighter aircraft to nuclear power plants and infrastructure. 

Having "fathered" Pakistan's nuclear-weapons program, China is now set to "grandfather" Pakistan's civilian nuclear-energy program as well. Chinese and Pakistani strategists gloat over how Beijing is building naval bases around India that will enhance the Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean. 

However, the best-laid plans might come unstuck if Pakistan fails to pacify Balochistan province, where Gwadar is located. The growing Balochi independence movement, which has repeatedly targeted Chinese engineers since 2004, makes the Chinese nervous about implementing their proposals for investment in the construction of a petrochemical complex, a pipeline and a railway line. 

Mutual suspicions, geopolitical tensions and a zero-sum mentality add to a very competitive dynamic in the China-Pakistan-India triangular relationship. Beijing and Islamabad are concerned over the growing talk in Washington's policy circles of India emerging as a counterweight to China on the one hand and the fragile, radical Islamic states of Southwest Asia on the other, viewing a potential US-Indian alignment with horror. 

The US military bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and India's growing footprint in Afghanistan cause alarm in Beijing and Islamabad. Some Chinese strategists worry about the destabilizing consequences of a prolonged US military presence in "Af-Pak" for the future of Sino-Pakistani ties, as well as on Pakistan's domestic stability. While the remarkable upturn in Indian-American security ties has exacerbated the security dilemma, the post-9/11 US military presence in Pakistan has sharpened the divide within the Pakistani military into pro-West and pro-Beijing factions. 

Jammu and Kashmir

Dargah Hazrat Bal - Landmark of Srinagar, the Capital

                    

THE COUNTRY WITHOUT A POST OFFICE

by Shubho

Ever since the partition in 1947, Kashmir problem is simmering between India and Pakistan. Both countries fought three wars and the main cause of these wars has been Kashmir. India maintains that the one time princely state, Kashmir is its integral part. Pakistan contests this stance and has stresses a solution based on fair and free plebiscite which would allow the people decide their own future through a right of self determination; whether they wish to continue living in India or would want to secede and join Pakistan.

Though both India and Pakistan remain ‘fastened’ to their respective stands, there have been efforts on the way to resolve this decade’s long dispute between two nuclear neighbors. Various formulas are being discussed by which no one loses its face and a solution agreeable to all parties, is finalized. Deliberations of these talks, referred to as Track II diplomacy have been kept secret (for obvious reasons). Even in the valley itself three different views persist. 1) Those who think separation of Kashmir from Indian Union is unconceivable. 2) Those who want to secede from India and join Pakistan. 3) Those who would wish Kashmir an independent state.

Scant details of these options available are based on four different scenarios. It is said that the Chenab formula was almost agreed by all the parties before departure of Gen. Perviaz Musharraf from the scene.

Shortly before a no confidence move against him, Sardar Ateeq Ahmad Khan, former Prime Minister of Azad Kashmir in an interview, did hint to some extent of a solution on similar lines.(WOP will cover this option including other scenarios in its next post)

 The first one of this series is being inserted in our current issue. Written by Shubho, a fellow blogger from India, it will be followed by a second report by BBC on the four scenarios under consideration.

The third and the fourth post again from India show the picture in the valley and views by so many Indians who believe a solution of this 61 years old dispute must be sought.

We at WOP believe: being part of the Indian sub-continent, the two neighbors who share landmass, mountain ranges, rivers and seas, ancient cultures, history, and religions cannot be and should not be a hostage to this or that issue. Soft borders and free trade between the two can release immense potential in terms of tourism, intercultural exchange, and a common South Asian approach to world affairs.